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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3001
___________
IN RE: MARK SNYDER,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 07-cv-01425)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 14, 2009
Before: McKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 22, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Mark Snyder, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania affirming an order of the United States
Bankruptcy Court. We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
In 2003, Snyder and his family members defaulted on several mortgages, resulting
in the initiation of mortgage foreclosure proceedings in state court. Shortly before default

judgments were entered in the foreclosure proceedings, Snyder and his family members
began to file bankruptcy petitions. The Bankruptcy Court granted in rem relief from the
automatic stay so that the foreclosures could be completed. After the properties were sold
at Sheriff’s sales, Snyder filed a state court action alleging, among other things,
conversion of his personal property at one of the properties. The Bankruptcy Court
reopened Snyder’s bankruptcy case, which had been dismissed, so that the court could
determine the interests of Snyder and the estate in the personal property at issue.1
At the hearing on reopening, Snyder stated that he intended to file another action
in state court to recover personal items and business assets in the FUBAR lounge, a bar
located in a motel, which he had operated. Appellee John Tomasic, who acquired the
FUBAR lounge through the foreclosure proceedings, asked the Bankruptcy Court to
resolve Snyder’s claims to the property. The Bankruptcy Court ordered Tomasic to file
an inventory of the items in the building.
As further discussed in the District Court’s opinion, the Bankruptcy Court held
several hearings to determine what property belonged to the estate and what property
should be returned to Snyder. During the course of the hearings, Snyder returned to the
FUBAR lounge to get his personal property. The Bankruptcy Court ultimately ordered

1

The Bankruptcy Court created an adversary proceeding for the removed state
court action. The Bankruptcy Court ultimately dismissed Snyder’s complaint, and the
District Court affirmed the dismissal. We reviewed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in
the adversary proceeding in C.A. No. 08-2684, in which we affirmed the District Court’s
order.
2

that any remaining non-estate property be removed by December 28, 2006, and that any
disputes regarding what could be removed required that a motion be filed by that date.
No such motions were filed.
At a conference on January 5, 2007, Tomasic reported that Snyder violated the
Bankruptcy Court’s order by removing a fixture – a railing – from the FUBAR lounge
and a Coca-Cola machine from another area of the motel. On January 26, 2007, the
Bankruptcy Court ruled that all disputes were complete and that Snyder no longer had any
claim to personalty left at the FUBAR lounge. The Bankruptcy Court also directed
Snyder to return the railing. Snyder filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
Bankruptcy Court had not decided his claims that various items were damaged or missing
when he went to replevy them. He also argued that the railing was not a fixture.2 In an
order dated August 3, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court denied Snyder’s motion, stating that
there were no missing items, and that, to the extent that there were any missing items,
Snyder did not establish which items were missing despite the many opportunities
provided by the court. The Bankruptcy Court further found that a table was damaged by
the weather after it was not timely removed by Snyder, and that the railing, which was
bolted to the floor, was a fixture. Snyder appealed.

2

The disposition of the Coca-Cola machine is the subject of a separate order, and is
not at issue in this appeal.
3

Noting that Snyder did not address in his brief how he satisfied the requirements
for a motion for reconsideration, the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s
order. The District Court rejected Snyder’s arguments that the Bankruptcy Court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims to property at the FUBAR lounge. The District Court
explained that the Bankruptcy Court had previously granted in rem relief from the
automatic stay in Snyder’s sibling’s bankruptcy proceedings to allow the foreclosure of
the property where the FUBAR lounge is located. In addition, the District Court noted
that Snyder’s bankruptcy case had already been reopened to remove Snyder’s state court
action when the FUBAR lounge matter came up. The District Court explained that the
Bankruptcy Court sought to ensure that Snyder got his property back and that the estate
retained its property.
We agree that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Snyder’s claims.
At the June 2, 2006, hearing, the Bankruptcy Judge recognized the limited bankruptcy
purpose of the proceedings before her, noting that Snyder had not filed a Chapter 13 plan
and was unable to make plan payments. The Bankruptcy Court, however, explained that
it was the only court that could determine what personalty belonged to Snyder because
that decision would determine what personalty was the property of the estate, a core
matter in the bankruptcy. Although Snyder further asserted in District Court that the
Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over property he acquired after he filed his

4

bankruptcy petition, the District Court correctly noted that Snyder did not produce
evidence establishing the acquisition dates of the property.
In addition, for the reasons stated by the District Court, we find no merit to
Snyder’s argument that the Bankruptcy Court erred in relying on representations by
Tomasic’s counsel’s in finding that Snyder was at fault for damaged property and items
that were not returned to him.
Because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will summarily affirm
the District Court’s order.

5

